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The Effect of Cost Categories and the Origin of their stickiness on 
Earnings Forecast: A Comparative Study 
 
Abstract                                  
The main aim of this study is to separate the origins of “selling, general, and administrative 
costs (SG&A)” and “cost of goods sold (COGS)” stickiness, and investigate their sources 
effects on earnings forecast accuracy (EFA). In previous research, various micro and macro 
factors have been shown to affect asymmetric cost behavior. These factors are rooted in the 
industry and firm-specific characteristics or specific events, which may occur each year at 
national or international scales. In this study, in the first step, a new methodology is presented 
to separate the sources of cost stickiness, including a novel method for calculating cost 
stickiness for each firm-year. In the second step, we investigated the effect of each firm-year 
stickiness and each source of stickiness on the EFA. The statistical population of the study 
consisted of all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, from which 1080 
observations in 2014-2018 period were selected and reviewed. Our results indicated that EFA 
has a negative and significant relationship with SG&A and COGS stickiness, stickiness of 
each year and each company, but no significant relationship was found with stickiness of each 
industry. Our results demonstrated that the stickiness of SG&A to COGS has a greater effect 
on the EFA. The findings suggest that the events of each year and the intra-organizational 
events of each company have a greater impact on cost behavior. Hence, it is necessary for 
managers and financial analysts to take into account each source of cost stickiness, especially 
year-specific events and firm-specific characteristics, and consider their effects in earnings 
forecast to improve their EFA. 
 Keywords: Cost stickiness, Cost categories, Earnings Forecast, Origin of cost stickiness. 
 












Over the past two decades, a growing body of accounting research has looked into the 
asymmetric response of costs to changes in activity levels. The results of these studies suggest 
that costs fall (rise) when the level of activities fall (rise), but the rate of costs reduction is less 
than the reduction in activities. In contrast, the rate of increase in costs is almost proportional 
to the improvement in the level of activities. This type of cost behavior is called cost 
stickiness. Anderson et al. (2003) were the first to focus on asymmetric SG&A to illustrate 
that cost stickiness has a negative effect on the firm's current earnings. It is because sales 
shrinkage is not offset by a reduction in costs. In their view, senior managers have authority 
over SG&A costs. By reviewing and criticizing traditional models of cost behavior, they 
presented a new model in which costs do not change relative to changes in the level of 
activities. Rather, changes are based on decisions made by managers. They declare that two 
main causes of cost stickiness are "the theory of manager’s personal considerations” that serve 
personal interest and "the theory of adjusted costs ". According to the former theory, managers 
do not always make decisions that provide the best outcomes for shareholders. Managers tend 
to maximize their own interests and may therefore be reluctant to cut back on resources in 
order to prevent a power reduction. One of the consequences of opportunistic contracts is 
managerial empire, meaning that management tends to overgrow the company and maintain 
untapped resources in order to preserve and increase personal interests, including prestige, 
position, power, reward, and credibility. 
According to "the theory of adjusted costs" or "cost adjustments", when demand for an 




adjust the associated costs. If decreased activity level is temporary, the cost adjustment and 
the subsequent increase (due to the raised activity level) will likely exceed the cost of 
retaining redundant resources that have been temporarily conserved. The resource adjustment 
costs may include severance payments to dismissed employees, assets disposal costs, and 
penalties for terminating contracts. In addition, if the demand for products keeps rising after 
the cost adjustment, the firm will incur costs such as acquiring new assets based on conditions 
set by the company, recruiting and training new employees and negotiating costs for signing 
new contracts. Therefore, costs are not only proportionate to the current level of sales, but also 
may be reliant on managers' expectations for future sales.  
However, sometimes there are reasons other than the company level that complicates the 
adjustment of resources despite managers' pessimism about the company's future. In this 
study, these factors are divided into macro to micro levels. At the first level, there are 
macroeconomic factors stemming from global and national developments, which contribute to 
cost stickiness. For example, events such as war, tariff warfare, sanctions, or global political 
crises at the international arena and changes in domestic policies (including amendments of 
laws or changes in political drivers that are expected to alter corporate support) affect 
management behavior in handling cost and therefore stickiness at the macro level. Given that 
these factors may vary at different times, the time factor (year) has been used to differentiate 
their effects. At the second level of stickiness, we look into industry-level factors. The 
industry-specific characteristics such as operational and production environment, intensity of 
competition and cost structure in different industries are other variables that influence the 




including the ability of managers to forecast future conditions and varying levels of risk 
aversion. 
Identifying the source of these factors enables managers to make appropriate decisions 
regarding resource adjustment. By identifying and measuring the sources of cost stickiness, 
managers can clarify and evaluate their reasons for cost stickiness and non-adjustment of 
costs, improving the company's flexibility in the face of diminishing demand for its goods or 
services. This helps improve the company's accountability process. By knowing the cost 
behavior, company owners can also determine whether management is imposing unnecessary 
costs on the firm. It is also useful to ascertain the cost behavior of external users (such as 
analysts) who intend to evaluate the company's performance. Therefore, identifying the origin, 
can be effective in measuring and controlling the degree of cost stickiness and its 
consequences. 
Based on the theoretical framework of financial reporting, cost segregation provides more 
comprehensive information on the behavior of different types of costs. When costs are 
considered as total costs, we can only judge the behavior of total costs at the time of the 
change in sales, while each type of cost may have different behaviors. Therefore, in this study, 
to further investigate the behavior of costs, costs are categorized based on function and 
examined. For this purpose, in this research, costs are divided into two groups: Selling, 
general, and administrative (SG&A) and cost of goods sold (COGS). 
As noted in a few numbers of previous researches, one of the major consequences of cost 
stickiness is its effect on the EFA. Most financial managers and analysts project earnings 
irrespective of the effects of cost stickiness on future expenses, which underline the EFA. 




impact of its sources on future earnings. Therefore, as the second goal of this study, we 
consider the importance of accurate earnings forecast and its impact on users' decisions, and 
seek to investigate the effect of the degree of cost stickiness on EFA and measure the relative 
share of each stickiness source on EFA. 
Therefore, the main contributions of this research to the literature on cost stickiness are:  
1) Identifying, separating and measuring stickiness sources, 
2) Examining the separate consequences and impacts of each cost stickiness source on EFA. 
In the following, first, the theoretical foundations and research background are discussed 
and the hypotheses are proposed. Then the data are described and descriptive statistics are 
presented. In the next section, following the separation of cost stickiness sources, the impact 
of each source on the EFA is evaluated. Finally, the study results concluded and suggestions 
presented. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
According to previous research, multiple factors influence cost stickiness. Each of these 
factors are related to specific characteristics of each year [Lee et al. (2020), Awad and Awad 
(2015)], country [(Calleja  et al. (2006), Byzalov & Chen (2013), Banker & Byzalov (2014), 
Kama & Weiss (2013),], industry [Banker, Flasher & Zhang (2014), Subramaniam et al. 
(2016)] and firm [Banker et al. (2014), Subramaniam et al. (2016), Dierynck & Renders 
(2009), Kama and Weiss (2013), Hay et al. (2010), Banker et al. (2011) and Chen et al. 
(2011)]. For example, setting varying tariffs by the United States on European and Chinese 
goods in 2018 is one of the events that can affect the economies of the parties, the level of 




States. Moreover, the imposition of various economic sanctions against Iran affects GDP, 
sales and the degree of cost stickiness based on managers' optimism or pessimism about the 
country's economic future. Besides, a number of factors such as technology level, which is 
rooted in the development of a country, and industry membership, can affect the degree of 
cost stickiness. In addition, laws and regulations of each country, corporate governance, and a 
host of other factors can influence the degree of cost stickiness. Each of these sources can 
trigger cost stickiness, but as noted by researchers [(Calleja  et al. (2006), Banker , Byzalov & 
Chen (2013), Banker & Byzalov (2014), Lee et al. (2020), Awad and Awad (2015)] 
identifying some of these factors could be ambiguous and increase the probability of errors in 
decisions. As mentioned earlier, in this study, the sources of stickiness are divided into three 
levels: year, industry and firm. Each of these three levels is discussed in detail below. 
Certain global and local events alter the degree of cost stickiness. These factors can be 
provoked by special political or economies events such as sanctions, war, tariff warfare, 
elections and political instability. According to Anderson et al. (2003), management not only 
takes into account the specific characteristics of a company in declining demand, but also 
analyzes the economic development in the product market and economic conditions at the 
global scale. Managers tend to see demand reduction as temporary whenever they expect 
significant economic growth. War and sanctions can make managers pessimistic about the 
future and influence their decisions about resource adjustment. Lee et al. (2020) suggested that 
even by controlling company-level and country-level factors, the cost behavior asymmetry 
(cost stickiness) in election years will be greater than in non-election years. Economic 
sanctions are also one of the major tools for achieving political goals, which prompt economic 




imposed on Iran have engendered serious economic problems, so that the production and sale 
of almost all industries have been adversely affected. Sanctions have always been a major 
hurdle to Iran's progress and development, which while hampering the introduction of modern 
technologies to Iran and reducing oil and non-oil exports, have rendered investors pessimistic 
about the country's economic future and managers disappointed with corporate futures. 
Economic sanctions, as economic and political destabilizers, will modify the asymmetric 
behavior of costs, and the asymmetric cost behavior and managers' pessimism about the 
company's future will exert a negative effect on the degree of cost stickiness.  
The industry-specific characteristics affect costs adjustment when the scale of the 
company’s activity is modified. These features can be split into two groups. The first group 
consists the intensity of assets and employees. The second group embraces other industry-
specific characteristics such as operating and production environment, competition intensity, 
fixed and variable cost ratios, and supply chain. Anderson et al. (2003) contend assets and 
employees intensity as two main specific characteristics of the company that affect the 
adjustment of costs. It is assumed that the intensity of assets alters the adjustment of resources, 
because a decrease in assets is not commensurate with the decline in the company's activities. 
In firms with higher asset intensity, the costs associated with their resources, such as 
depreciation, repairs and maintenance costs will be higher, and failure to reduce costs relative 
to the level of activity will lead to cost stickiness. Therefore, assets have a huge bearing on 
cost stickiness because small companies usually hold less fixed assets. This indicates low 
costs associated with assets and when the level of activity shrinks, the stickiness in these 
companies will be lower. Employee intensity affects cost adjustment for three reasons. First, 




be worry about losing skilled, experienced, and loyal employees. Second, if demand for 
products rises, the firm will be forced to hire new employees, which will incur recruitment and 
training costs. Third, layoffs will dampen the morale of other employees and diminish 
productivity. A mixture of these factors leads to the non-dismissal of employees, and 
consequently the lack resources and costs adjustment. Therefore, with a higher number of 
employees, the costs of deescalating the level of activity stickiness will be higher. In their 
research, they looked into the effect of these two factors on cost stickiness, concluding that 
these factors have a positive effect on the level of adjusted costs at the firm level. 
Cost structure varies significantly in diverse industries. For example, according to Elie 
(1991), the ratio of cost to sales is 5% in the coal industry and 66% in pharmaceutical product 
industry. Subramaniam et al. (2003) concluded that the highest rate of cost stickiness belonged 
to manufacturing companies followed by service and commercial companies. In contrast, they 
did not observe any sign of asymmetric cost behavior in financial companies. Anderson et al. 
(2004) investigated cost behavior in service companies, reporting the absence of any sticky 
costs in the retail sector, while the entertainment sector had the highest cost stickiness. 
According to their research, not only the degree of cost stickiness varies in different 
industries, but also the factors that provoke cost sticky behavior may exert divergent effects in 
each industry. They reported that, assets, staff and the prospect of improved sales had no 
effect on the degree of cost stickiness in the entertainment sector; while these factors had an 
undeniable impact on the degree of service costs in the hotel and restaurant industry. 
Firm characteristics that could affect cost stickiness are, asset intensity, employee intensity, 




employee, as discussed above, not only affected by industry type but also the firm-specific 
features have a significant effect on them. 
Banker et al. (2006a) verified the relationship between utilized capacity and sticky cost 
behavior, attempting to expand this concept. According to Anderson et al. (2003), managers' 
expectations of the company's future performance play a pivotal role in adjustment/ non- 
adjustment of the company's resources. 
In another study, Banker et al. (2011d) used indices of managerial optimism and pessimism 
to offer more empirical evidence for their argument, contending that managers' expectations 
are a determinant of cost behavior. Banker et al. (2011d) found that if these indicators transmit 
clear and continuous positive signals about the future of the company, the degree of cost 
stickiness will increase, but if conflicting or negative signals are sent, cost stickiness will 
plunge. In another study, Banker et al. (2011c) tested the model of Banker et al. (2011d) on an 
international sample, and their findings ratifying the above outcomes for most of countries. 
Overall, the existing literature and theoretical foundations present strong evidence for 
stickiness in diverse types of costs in different years, industries, and companies. The research 
literature offers various reasons for cost stickiness, including managers' optimism and 
pessimism about sales prospects, earnings management, the nature of costs (in terms of 
controllability and uncontrollability), government regulations, technology level, employment 










2.1. Hypothesis Development 
A variety of factors can influence the EFA. According to previous research [Weiss (2010), 
Cifitci and Salama (2018)] asymmetric cost behavior is one of the main factors affecting the 
EFA. Weiss (2010) contends that there is a negative relationship between cost stickiness and 
EFA. He states that sticky companies tend to forecast low future earnings, which explain the 
higher errors in projection of future earnings. Cifitci et al. (2016) argue that if analysts can 
fully understand cost behavior, no systematic relationship will be observed between cost 
behavior and EFE. On the other hand, if analysts fail to take cost stickiness into account in 
their forecasts, the degree of EFE will be significantly different at the time of declining and 
rising demand. Cifitci and Salama (2018) revealed a positive relationship between cost 
stickiness and EFE, because managers and analysts do not consider adverse consequences of 
cost stickiness in earnings forecast. If financial analysts are accurate in estimating variable 
costs or cost stickiness, the EFE should be symmetrical with the abnormal sales (desirable or 
undesirable). They stated that accurate cost forecast has a significant impact on the EFA. 
Therefore, according to the above, it can be stated that the degree of cost stickiness is one of 
the major factors that can influence the EFA and if financial analysts and managers fail to 
account for the degree of cost stickiness in their forecasts, they may have more mistake in 
earnings prediction. Based on the above, by separating the costs and analyzing the behavior of 
each of them, we can have a comprehensive analysis. Based on previous research, it is 
expected that the stickiness intensity of different types of costs will be different and have a 




H1: SG&A and COGS stickiness have a different effect on EFA. 
However, since the sources of cost stickiness are different and triggered by year, industry 
and firm-specific events and circumstances, we expect that the impact of each of these sources 
on the EFA be different. Forecasting and controlling events of each year, and identifying the 
firm-specific features is more complicates than other stickiness sources. 
Therefore, the greater the impact of each sources on SG&A and COGS stickiness, the lower 
the EFA. Hence, the second hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
H2: Each source of SG&A and COGS stickiness has a different effect on EFA. 
3. Research Design  
3.1. Separation of cost stickiness sources 
The degree of cost stickiness will be measured using the model of Anderson et al. (2003) 





 = B0 + B1 . Log  
Salesf,t
Salesf,t−1
 + B2. DD. Log  
Salesf,t
Salesf,t−1
 + ef ,t 
As noted by Anderson et al. (2003), “If sales revenue rises, the dummy variable of sales 
decrease (DD) will be zero. Thus, coefficient B1 shows an increase in costs as a result of a 1% 
rise in sales revenue. Moreover, since the coefficient of the dummy variable of sales is equal 
to 1 when revenue decrease, the sum of coefficients B1 + B2 denotes the percentage reduction 
in costs as a result of 1% reduction in sales revenue.  
In sticky cases, the percentage of increase in costs during revenue growth period will be 
greater than the percentage of decrease in costs during revenue decrement. In other words, we 




B1 + B2> B1. It indicates that for 1% change in sales, the costs reduction will be greater than 
the rising costs. 
We use three steps to separate the stickiness sources as follow. First, model (1) is run by all 
observations and overall stickiness is calculated by B2 coefficient. The calculated coefficient 
(B2) is affected by year, industry and firm. Then to control the effects of year, model (1) is 
tested for each year and the coefficient  B2 is calculated for each year (B2,y) that influenced by 
the effects of industry and company. Therefore, by comparing B2,y and  B2 the degree of 
relative stickiness of each year (CSy) can be calculated  
Second, we use the previous calculated B2,y and then, to control the effects of industry, 
model (1) will be run for each industry in each year.  When name the coefficient B2,y,i which is 
influenced by the effects of the company. Therefore, by comparing B2,y,i and  B2, y , the degree 
of relative stickiness of each industry in each year (𝐶𝑆𝑦 ,𝑖) is obtained. 
Third, since the number of observations is limited to one to determine the relative stickiness 
of each firm; hence, it is impossible to test regression for a single data. However, for the 
homogeneity of calculations with previous steps, the degree of relative stickiness of each 
company can be obtained as follow. Supposed line 𝐶𝑆𝑦 ,𝑖 indicates the regression relationship of 
these points for a specific company in a given industry and year according to the model 1 that 
ran in industry-year level with the slope of B2,y,i. We assume that the intercept illustrates 
factors, which are the same in all observations of that industry-year and the difference of each 
observation is related to the specific cost stickiness of that point. The slope of each point (such 
as F1) with a line (𝐿𝐹(𝑦 ,𝑖 ,𝑓) ) that originating from the intercept shows the total stickiness of that 
observation (𝐵𝑦 ,𝑖 ,𝑓). In a similar way to other sources of cost stickiness, the relative cost 




 B2,y,i calculated. A summary of the points discussed in this section and the conceptual model 
of separation of cost stickiness sources are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Step   Sticky source  observations  Coefficient  Relative stickiness index 
---  ---  (1) Overall       𝐵2  --- 




 = 𝐶𝑆𝑦         2  
2  Industry  (1) Industry-year  






= 𝐶𝑆𝑦 ,𝑖            3  
3  Company  (4)single observation  𝐵2,𝑦 ,𝑖 ,𝑓    
𝐵𝑦 ,𝑖 ,𝑓
 𝐵2,𝑦 ,𝑖   
= 𝐶𝑆𝑦 ,𝑖 ,𝑓   4  
                          Figure 1 - Conceptual model of separating cost stickiness sources 
 
3.2. Testing Research Hypotheses  
According to previous research, multiple factors influence the EFA. To test the research 
hypotheses and explain how cost stickiness and its sources can reduce EFA, it is necessary to 
control other variables affecting EFA. Therefore, to test the research hypotheses, we used the 
models proposed by Weiss (2010), Cifitci and Salama (2018) and Anderson et al. (2007). In 
this research, we used model 5 to test the first hypothesis (SG&A and COGS stickiness); and 
model 8 for second hypothesis (SG&A and COGS stickiness sources). 
Model (5): 
𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒇,𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑓 ,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑉𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸  𝑓 ,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑓 ,𝑡  






𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚 + 𝛽2𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊 + 𝛽4𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽9∆𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓 ,𝑡  
𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚 + 𝛽2𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊 + 𝛽4𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽9∆𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸  𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓 ,𝑡  
 
To verify the validity of the results, we calculated the cost stickiness by Anderson et al.’s 
model (2007) and confirming our first hypothesis results with them. The main reason for 
choosing this model is the ability of that to measure cost stickiness for each firm-year. We 
used their cost behavior proxies (𝑆𝐺𝐴 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑓 ,𝑡
−  ; 𝑆𝐺𝐴 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑓 ,𝑡
+  , 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑓 ,𝑡
−  , 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑓 ,𝑡
+ ) and 
substituted them in model 5 with our proxy (𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑓 ,𝑡  & 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑓,𝑡) and obtained the model 7.   




 𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
− 𝒇,𝒕  +  𝛽2 𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
+
𝒇,𝒕
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑓 ,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑉𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡   
+  𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝑓 ,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑓 ,𝑡  
  
 𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
− 𝒇,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
+
𝒇,𝒕
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑓 ,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑉𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡   
+  𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓 ,𝑡 +  𝛽7∆𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝑓 ,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑓 ,𝑡  
 








Descriptions of variables (alphabetic) 
Variable Description 
AP Actual earnings per share (EPS) 
COGS Total stickiness of cost of goods sold  
COGSSy Relative COGS stickiness for each year when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson et al 
(2007).  
 
COGSS,i Relative industry-year COGS stickiness when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson et al 
(2007). 
 
COGSS,i,t Relative firm-industry-year COGS stickiness when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson et al 
(2007). 
 
Decrease _Dummy The dummy variable takes the value of 1 when sales revenue decreases between period t −1 and t, and 0 
otherwise. 
FP Management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts 
FE 
𝐹𝐸𝑓 ,𝑡  =  
(𝐴𝑃𝑓 ,𝑡  − 𝐹𝑃𝑓 ,𝑡   )
𝐹𝑃𝑓 ,𝑡
  
The absolute forecast errors. 
 
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the reported earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. 
MV Logarithm of market value of equity + Liabilities 
∆NINCOME Indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings from the prior year is positive, and 0 otherwise 
 
OPLEV Ratio of gross income (sales, minus COGS) and sales 
Sale Total revenue 
SGAS Total stickiness selling, general, and administrative costs  
 
SGASy Relative  SG&A of  cost stickiness for each year when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson 
et al (2007).  
 
SGASy,i Relative industry-year SG&A cost stickiness when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson et al 
(2007). 
 
SGASy,i,t Relative firm-industry-year SG&A cost stickiness when sales decrease and 0 otherwise, similar to Anderson 
et al (2007). 
 
𝑆𝐺𝐴 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙− The SGA cost signal- (cost stickiness) of each firm-year when sales decrease and 0 otherwise.  








𝑆𝐺𝐴 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙+ The SGA cost signal+ of each firm-year when sales increase and 0 otherwise.  
The positive SGA cost signal based on Anderson et al.’s model (2007) is calculated as follows:: 






        




3.3. Description of Data  
Our sample includes all industrial firms from 2013 to 2018. Table 2 describes industry 
information. The sample was chosen according to the first two-digit SIC-Code
2
 industry, 
which displays the code of identifying the major industry group. Since regression model must 
be fitted in each industry-year to compute the cost stickiness in each industry-year. We also 
exclude firm-year observations in the financial services industry due to the disparity of 






                                                                                Observation 
152  Motor Vehicles 
143 Mineral Mining 
193 Chemical 
138 Food 







                                                          
2
 Standard Industrial Classification  








𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙+ The COGS signal+ of each firm-year when sales increase and 0 otherwise.  
The positive COGS signal based on Anderson et al.’s model (2007) is calculated as follows:: 






        
VSALE The percentage change of sales to previous year. 






Table 3 describes our sample selection procedure. Our sample consists of all companies listed 
on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)
3
 from 2013-2018. We trimmed the data to eliminate 
extreme observations by removing observations where the value of any variable was in the top 
or bottom 0.5 percent of its distribution (Chen & Dixon, 1972). The final sample contains 
1080 firm-year observations from 2014 to 2018. 
 
 
Table (4) demonstrates descriptive statistics in three columns (low EFE, High EFE, and all 
sample data). The low and high EFE distinguished by the median static. By comparing the 
average SGAS, COGSS, and their resources in the two groups, it can be stated that SGAS and 









                                                          
3 The TSE is Iran’s largest capital market. For detailed information about the TSE, refer to http://www.TSE.ir/. 
Table 3 
Sample selection procedures 
Observation 
2219 All companies listed on the TSE from 2013 to 2018 
966 Financial industry companies 
173 Firms with insufficient information 






Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
Variables 
low EFE High EFE All Sample Data 
N Mean N Mean N Mean 
FE 540 0.356 540 2.005 1080 0.873 
 
SGAS 540 0.010 540 0.233 1080 0.110 
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚 540 0.240 540 0.354 1080 0.298 
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊 540 0.112 540 0.157 1080 0.121 
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 540 0.295 540 0.340 1080 0.314 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺 540 0.187 540 0.430 1080 0.199 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚 540 0.314 540 0.528 1080 0.403 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊 540 0.160 540 0.232 1080 0.199 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 540 0.361 540 0.775 1080 0.521 
𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍− 540 0.004 540 0.009 1080 0.021 
 𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍+ 540 -0.003 540 -0.0001 1080 -0.002 
𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍− 540 0.009 540 0.011 1080 0.034 
𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍+ 540 0.0002 540 -0.024 1080 -0.005 
MV 540 8.044 540 7.819 1080 7.935 
VSALE 540 0.084 540 0.082 1080 0.081 
OPLEV 540 0.284 540 0.221 1080 0.253 
∆NINCOME 540 -0.132 540 -0.441 1080 -0.257 
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1. Separation of Cost stickiness sources 
To separating the cost stickiness sources we apply model (1) three times, first with all 
observations that results showed on table 5, second for each year, and third for each industry-





Results of Regressing Changes in Costs on Changes in Sales Revenue for the 5-Year Period 
2014–2018 
 Panel A: SG&A 
Model (1):  𝑳𝒐𝒈  
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝒇,𝒕
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 = 𝑩𝟎 + 𝑩𝟏. 𝑳𝒐𝒈  
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 + 𝑩𝟐. 𝑫𝑫. 𝑳𝒐𝒈  
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 + 𝒆𝒇,𝒕 




  + 












        0.000 
Constant  
0.003       
(0.47) 
0.637 
Adjusted R Square 76.40% 
Observation 1080 
Panel B: COGS 
Model (1):  𝑳𝒐𝒈 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝒇,𝒕
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 = 𝑩𝟎 + 𝑩𝟏. 𝑳𝒐𝒈 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 + 𝑩𝟐. 𝑫𝑫. 𝑳𝒐𝒈  
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒇,𝒕−𝟏
 + 𝒆𝒇,𝒕 























Adjusted R Square 
 
   67.15%   
Observation     1080   
 
The coefficient β2 is a negative estimate that indicates the degree of stickiness in all 
observations, which is equal to -0.361 in SG&A and equal to -0.743 in COGS. 
  In table 6, Cost Stickiness ( B2,y  ) showed the stickiness of each year, and could be 
influenced by the effects of industry and company. By comparing  𝐵2  and 𝐵2,𝑦  , the degree of 







Cost Stickiness and Relative Cost Stickiness for Each Year each Industry-Year Over 2014–2018 
Panel A: SG&A 
 
Origin 





































Building -0.121 3.666 -0.087 -1.060 0.345 1.241 -1.142 0.001 -0.125 0.146 
Food -0.057 1.727 -0.452 5.512 -0.214 0.769 -1.142 0.147 -0.078 0.091 
Mineral Mining 0.145 -4.393 -0.254 -3.097 -0.254 0.769 -0.378 0.547 -0.275 0.322 
Base Metals -0.402 0.322 -0.075 0.102 -0.025 0.730 0.02 0.565 0.035 -0.041 
Chemical -0.111 3.636 0.001 0.012 -0.021 0.075 -0.052 0.075 0.214 -0.251 
Pharmaceuticals -0.055 1.666 -0.061 -0.743 -0.214 0.769 -0.124 0.200 -0.251 0.294 
Motor Vehicles 0.004 -0.121 -0.010 -0.121 -0.241 0.866 -0.214 0.309 0.125 -0.146 
Panel B: COGS 
 
Origin 





































Building -0.478 0.138 -0.103 0.257 -0.147 2.672 -1.445 11.829 -0.458 2.053 
Food -0.023 0.138 -0.365 0.912 -0.458 8.327 -0.555 4.512 -0.112 5.090 
Mineral Mining 0.036 -0.216 1.512 -3.780 -0.585 10.636 -0.558 4.536 -0.745 3.340 
Base Metals -0.254 1.530 -0.221 0.552 -0.254 4.618 0.447 -3.634 0.025 -0.112 
Chemical 0.444 -2.674 0.551 1.377 -0.112 2.036 -0.254 2.065 0.458 2.053 
Pharmaceuticals -0.551 -4.548 -0.122 -1.675 -0.222 -5.090 0.452 -1.772 -0.125 2.829 
Motor Vehicles 0.551 -3.319 -0.254 0.635 -0.452 8.218 0.225 -1.829 -0.478 2.143 
 
As depicted in Table (6), the relative stickiness in SG&A was the highest in 2017 and 2018, 
which indicates the strong effects of the events in 2017 and 2018 on the degree of stickiness. 
The most important event of 2018 was the withdrawal of the United States from JCPOA
4
 and 
the imposition of new sanctions against Iran, which was a major hurdle to the production and 
export of many industries in Iran and cut its production capacity, so that companies faced 
significant unutilized resources. 
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Table 6 also represents the results of executing cost stickiness regression at the industry-year 
level. By comparing the cost stickiness coefficient of this model with the results of cost 
stickiness, the relative effects of industry on cost stickiness can be determined.  
4.2. Testing Hypothesis 
4.2.1. SG&A and COGS stickiness and EFA (H1) 
The test results of first hypothesis are presented in table 7 and 8. The hypothesis test results 
are reported in two columns of these tables; the first column is based on our model (model 5) 
and the second column is based on Anderson et al (2007) model (model 6). As shown by the 
results in table 7, the SG&A stickiness of each company is positively and significantly 
correlated with the EFE and the hypothesis is confirmed with both models. The results 
calculated by our model illustrates a stronger relationship between cost stickiness and EFE. 
and significant (t-statistic = 2.09), suggesting that the stickiness of SG&A is directly and 
significantly related to the EFE. 
As shown by the results in table 12, the COGS stickiness of each company is positively and 
significantly correlated with the EFE and the hypothesis is confirmed with both models. The 











The SG&A stickiness coefficient estimated by our model was significantly positive (β1 = 
4.152, t-statistics= 4.20), which shows that the stickiness of SG&A is directly and significantly 
related to EFE, so that with one-unit increase in the SG&A stickiness, the EFE rises by 4.152. 
The coefficient of SG&A estimated by Anderson et al (2007) model was positive (β1 = 19.03).  
Table 7 
Regression Coefficient of Management Forecast Error on SG&A  Stickiness. 
  
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕  + 𝜷𝟒𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕   + 𝜷𝟓𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
Regression Model (7): 
 
Regression Model (10):   
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
− 𝒇,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟐 𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
+
𝒇,𝒕
  + 𝜷𝟑𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕 +   + 𝜷𝟓𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕   + 𝜷𝟔𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟕∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
 Coefficient Estimates 
(t-statistics) 
 
Independent variable Model (5) Model (6) 
SGAS 
       4.152***   
(4.20)   
 
𝑺𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍−   
     19.03** 
 (2.09)  
 




  -0.125** 
(-2.04) 





   9.976** 
(2.92) 
VSALE 










 0.152  
(0.44) 
   0.059** 













Number of observations                        1080  1080 




The COGS stickiness coefficient estimated by our model was significantly positive (β1 = 
6.165, t-statistics= 2.45), which shows that the stickiness of COGS is directly and significantly 
related to EFE, so that with one-unit increase in the COGS stickiness, the EFE rises by 6.165.  
Table 8 
Regression Coefficient of Management Forecast Error on  COGS Stickiness. 
  
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕  + 𝜷𝟒𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕   +  𝜷𝟓𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟔∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
Regression Model (5): 
 
Regression Model (6):   
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑨 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
− 𝒇,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍
+
𝒇,𝒕
  + 𝜷𝟑𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕 +   + 𝜷𝟓𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕   + 𝜷𝟔𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟕∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
 Coefficient Estimates 
(t-statistics) 
 
Independent variable Model (5) Model (6) 
COGSS 
 6.165**    
(2.45)   
 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍−   
      11.866** 
 (2.24)  
 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒂𝒍+   
    -5.532**  
(-2.32) 
MV 
  -0.254** 
(-2.11) 
     -1.212** 
(-2.28) 
LOSS 
     2.031** 
(2.21) 
     7.976** 
(2.52) 
VSALE 










 0.221  
(0.15) 
  0.121 
 (0.10) 
Constant 
     8.11** 
 (3.03) 
     -11.491**
 
(-3.00) 






Number of observations                        1080  1080 




The coefficient of COGS estimated by Anderson et al (2007) model was positive (β1 = 
11.866) and significant (t-statistic = 2.24), suggesting that the stickiness of COGS is directly 
and significantly related to the EFE. 
4.2.2. SG&A and COGS stickiness sources and EFE (H2) 
The test results of the second hypothesis are presented in Table 9 and 10. The results 
illustrate that the relative stickiness of each year and each company in both SG&A and COGS is 
significantly related with the EFE, while there is no significant relationship between the 
stickiness of each industry and EFE.  
The estimated coefficient of SG&A relative stickiness in each year was positive (β1 = 0.145) 
and significant (t-statistic = 3.21), indicating that the relative stickiness in each year is directly 
and significantly correlated with EFE. That is, with a one-unit increase in the relative 
stickiness of each year, the EFE rises by 0.145 units. The estimated coefficient of relative 
stickiness in each industry-year is positive (β2 = 0.050) and not significant (t-statistic = 0.02), 
demonstrating that the average relative stickiness of each industry did not induce a significant 
forecast error. In the company level, the estimated coefficient of relative stickiness was 
positive (β3 = 0.24) and significant (t-statistic = 2.00), suggesting that the relative stickiness of 










As shown by the results in table 10, the estimated coefficient of COGS relative stickiness in 
each year was positive (β1 = 0.121) and significant (t-statistic = 2.09), indicating that the 
relative stickiness in each year is directly and significantly correlated with EFE. That is, with a 
one-unit increase in the relative stickiness of each year, the EFE rises by 0.121 units. The 
Table 9 
Regression Coefficient of Management Forecast Error on the Sources of SG&A Stickiness. 
Regression Model (7): 
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝒚 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 +𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟔𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕 +
  𝜷𝟕𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕  𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
 Coefficient Estimates 
         (t-statistics) 
Independent variables Model (7)  
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝑺𝒚 




  0.050 
   (0.02) 
 
𝑺𝑮𝑨𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 
      0.024** 
  (2.00) 
 
MV 
    -0.124** 
  (-2.40) 
 
LOSS 
   0.142 
   (0.18) 
 
VSALE 
    0.010 
   (0.12) 
 
OPLEV 
  0.12 
  (1.12) 
 
∆NINCOME 
      
  - 0.121 
   (-5.42) 
 
Constant 
       0.124***
 
   (10.37)
  
                              Adjusted R-Square   8.31%                             
 
 
                                     Observation           1080 




estimated coefficient of relative stickiness in each industry-year is positive (β2 = 0.003) and 
not significant (t-statistic = 0.19), demonstrating that the average relative stickiness of each 
industry did not induce a significant forecast error.  
Table 10 
Regression Coefficient of Management Forecast Error on the Sources of COGS Stickiness. 
Regression Model (7): 
 𝑭𝑬𝒇,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 +𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑽𝒇,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒇,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟔𝑽𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝒇,𝒕 +
  𝜷𝟕𝑶𝑷𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒇,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖∆𝑵𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 𝒇,𝒕  𝜺𝒇,𝒕 
 
Coefficient Estimates  
       (t-statistics) 
Independent variables Model (7)  
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚 




  0.003 
   (0.19) 
 
𝑪𝑶𝑮𝑺𝑺𝒚,𝒊,𝒇 
      0.125** 
  (3.10) 
 
MV 
    -0.52** 
  (-2.05) 
 
LOSS 
      0.254** 
   (3.12) 
 
VSALE 
       0.125** 
   (2.45) 
 
OPLEV 
    0.541 
    (0.44) 
 
∆NINCOME 
      
       - 0.412** 
   (-2.41) 
 
Constant 
         0.441***
 
     (12.68)
  
                              Adjusted R-Square   10.12%                             
 
 
                                     Observation           1080 




In the company level, the estimated coefficient of relative stickiness was positive (β3 = 
0.125) and significant (t-statistic = 3.10), suggesting that the relative stickiness of each 
company has a direct and significant relationship with EFE. 
The comparison results illustrate that the year and company sources, regardless of the cost 
category, affect the EFE. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Comparison of cost stickiness source coefficients. 





















5. Summary and Conclusion  
According to previous research, one of the major consequences of cost stickiness is its 
adverse impact on the EFA. In the present study, we further investigated this subject by 
examining the relationship between the stickiness of each source of cost stickiness and the 
EFA. In this study, we presented a method that not only separated the sources of cost 
stickiness, but also calculated cost stickiness for each year-company. Then, the effect of 
SG&A and COGS stickiness and all of their sources on the EFA was investigated. The results 
showed that the degree of SG&A and COGS stickiness has a negative and significant 
relationship with the EFA so that a higher degree of stickiness decreased the EFA.  
Accordingly, investors, analysts, managers, and other users need to consider the 
consequences of total cost stickiness in forecasting future earnings and assessing the value of 




In addition, to further investigate the proposed method, each year-company stickiness was 
tested with the model of Anderson et al. (2007) and its effect on the EFA was explored. The 
results were aligned with those obtained from our proposed method. Findings also suggest that 
among the sources of cost stickiness, stickiness of each year and each company have a 
negative and significant effect on the EFA. It indicates that each year events and intra-
organizational events have a greater effect on EFA compared to other sources of cost 
stickiness. Therefore, it can be contended that by separating the sources of cost stickiness and 
including them in earnings forecast models, a more accurate estimate of future earnings can be 
made. It is worth to note that the findings of this study are consistent with those reported by 
Weiss (2010), Cifitci et al. (2016), Cifitci and Salama (2018) and Banker and Chen (2006). 
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